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Abstract 
Focusing on biolinguistic considerations, Merge is a formal operation proposed by 
theoretical linguistics and linked to specific principles of neural computation. In this 
sense, Merge can be viewed as a natural operation of the brain. Merge is commonly 
claimed to be a digital operation. In a first approximation, digital computation is the 
processing of strings of digits according to general rules defined over these digits. 
However, it seems that neural processes are not digital computations. These conflictive 
claims, e.g. the digital characterization of Merge and the non-digital characterization 
of the brain, leads to the following scenario: either Merge is an operation that is not 
realized in the brain or Merge is realized in the brain but not digitally. The purpose 
of this paper is to evaluate the problems posed by each thesis.
Key words: Language Faculty; Digital Operation; Analog Operation; Neural 
Computation
Resumen 
Desde la bioloinguistica, ensamble sería una operación digital realizada 
en el cerebro que, en tanto tal, estaría asociada a principios específicos de la 
computación neural. En una primera aproximación, la computación digital 
consiste en el procesamiento de cadenas de dígitos de acuerdo a reglas generales. 
Sin embargo, los procesos neurales no se desarrollarían de acuerdo a los principios 
de la computación digital. Estas afirmaciones en conflicto, e.g., la caracterización 
digital de ensamble y la caracterización no digital del cerebro, llevan al siguiente 
escenario: o bien ensamble es una operación que no realiza el cerebro, o bien es 
realizada por el cerebro pero no digitalmente. El propósito de este artículo es 
evaluar los problemas de estas dos tesis. 
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1. Introduction 
Within the biolinguistic approach, theoretical linguistics is 
biology “at a suitable level of abstraction” (Boeckx & Piattelli-Palmarini, 
2005). It studies the Faculty of Language (FL), which is understood to 
be a “cognitive organ” of the individual mind/brain which shares many 
of the properties of visual perception, motor action, etc. I-language (“I” 
signifying individual, internal and intentional) is the computational 
system of the FL that generates the expressions (logical and phonological 
forms) that interface with conceptual-intentional and sensory-motor 
systems. The computational operation of I-language that generates 
such expressions is called “Merge”. 
Merge is an operation that combines two syntactic objects α and 
β to form a complex syntactic object K. Chomsky maintains that the 
value of K must at least include a label indicating the type to which K 
belongs (Chomsky, 1995). Logical considerations lead him to conclude 
that the label of K must be constructed from the two constituents α and 
β. Accordingly, the value of Merge (α, β) is K, which is either {α,{α, β}}
or{β,{α, β}}. Merge allows grammars, being themselves finite, to generate 
an infinite number of linguistic expressions (Al-Mutairi, 2014). In other 
words, Merge is the recursive mechanism responsible for the apparent 
discrete infinity of natural languages in the sense that, when language 
are thought of as sets of expressions, these sets are infinite. The infinitude 
claim also involves the idea that there is no limit on the potential length 
of linguistic expressions (‘there is no longest sentence’) (Hulst, 2010). 
Given that many notions of Merge proliferate in the literature, I will 
restrict my presentation to Chomsky´s characterization. 
Focusing on biological considerations, the formal operations 
proposed at the level of theoretical linguistics are linked to specific 
principles of neural computation. In this sense, Merge can be viewed 
as a natural operation of the brain (Boeckx, 2013b). Merge is commonly 
claimed to be a digital operation. In Chomsky’s words, “…we can think 
of recursion [Merge] as enumeration of a set of discrete objects by a 
computable finitary procedure, one that can be programmed for an 
ordinary digital computer that has access to unlimited memory and 
time” (Chomsky, 2014, p. 1). In a first approximation, digital computation 
is the processing of strings of digits according to general rules defined 
over these digits (Piccinini & Scarantino, 2010). This notion of 
“computation” was inherited from the pioneering works of Turing on 
computable functions (Turing, 1936). However, it seems that neural 
computations do not manipulate digital procedures (Piccinini & Bahar, 
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2013). These conflictive claims, e.g. the digital nature of Merge and the 
non-digital characterization of the brain, lead to the following scenario: 
either Merge is best understood as an operation that is not realized in 
the brain or Merge is realized in the brain but not digitally. This paper 
aims to evaluate the problems of each thesis and, in particular, it will 
examine the scope and difficulties of the second thesis in some detail. 
The article is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the 
digital characterization of Merge, depicting a notion of “digit” and 
“digital operation” as inspired by Haugeland’s work. Section 3 presents 
my arguments as to why I believe that the brain does not operate in a 
digital way. For that purpose, I explore certain empirical data related 
to the electrochemical activity of the brain. Section 4 addresses the 
thesis that Merge is not realized in the brain and considers a range of 
methodological issues pertaining to the biolinguistic approach. Section 5 
analyzes the thesis that Merge is realized in the brain but not digitally. I 
suggest that neuronal activity has some analog properties and I discuss 
the difficulties for an analog system to realize a digital operation. And 
finally, Section 6 contains the conclusions of the article. 
A disclaimer from the start: I am not a linguist, and, aside from 
a few linguistic issues that I will simple present in the first sections, I 
do not expect to say anything that turns on details of linguistic theory. 
The point of my discussion does not need any substantive linguistic 
commitment. 
2. The Digital Characterization of Merge
Merge is taken to be the basic combinatorial operation of 
I-language (Fukui, 2011). In its most elementary form, Merge is a 
simple grouping procedure that puts α and β together. It is a binary 
operation that takes two constituents as inputs and combines them 
to form a novel constituent. Merge operates as a set formation rule, 
taking two already formed syntactic objects and constructing from 
them a new object: Merge (α), (β) = (α, β). This set formation operation is 
recursive, since it can be applied to its own outputs without limit, and 
it does not require any linear order in the members of the set (Boeckx, 
2009). Presumably, this set formation operation is very common across 
cognitive modules beyond the FL (Fujita, 2017).
Furthermore, Merge is a procedure that gives rise to endocentric 
structures, since the new already formed object is labeled by one of the 
inputs. Merge selects one of the two members to be the head of the new 
construction and the head would be the unit over which Merge operates 
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further combinations. For instance, when you put together a verb and 
a noun, typically what you get is a verb, and this complex construction 
acts as a verb in the next combinations. These headed constructions 
constitute the kind of hierarchical structures that we usually get in 
language. For instance, Merge composes the following hierarchical 
structure:
{Mary, loves, books}
First, composing a set that has “loves” and “books” as units and 
the verb as the head:
{loves {loves, books}}
And, second, forming another set that adds the unit “Mary” and 
keeps the verb as the head:
{loves {Mary {loves{loves, books}
In biolinguistic literature, Merge is generally considered a digital 
operation. Chomsky claims that “…we can think of recursion [Merge] 
as enumeration of a set of discrete objects by a computable finitary 
procedure, one that can be programmed for an ordinary digital computer 
that has access to unlimited memory and time” (Chomsky, 2014, p. 1) . 
It should be remarked that Merge yields a potentially infinite set of 
linguistic structures operating in the way drawn by the successor function 
(Chomsky, 2008; Kleene, 1952; Lobina, 2014). The successor function is 
a mathematical engine that underlies the “iterative conception of set”, 
which means a process in which sets are “recursively generated at each 
stage” (Boolos, 1971, p. 223). Peano´s definition of natural numbers is 
the classical locus, where the successor function is applied in order 
to construct a set and its members (Lobina, 2017). Following Kleene 
(1952) the successor function in natural numbers can be characterized 
in three steps: (i) 0 is a natural number (this is the basic clause), (ii) if 
n is a natural number, then n+1 (or n’) is also a natural number, (iii) all 
numbers are defined by steps (i) and (ii).  
Given that Merge would be mathematically characterized as a 
successor function and successor function is a computable function, its 
best explanation would to understand it as a digital operation. Systems 
which transform structures such as ⦳1, … ⦳n  into structures such 
as ⦳n +1 are best understood to manipulate rules that consider such 
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expressions as strings of digits. So, what then, would a digital operation 
be? The most straightforward notion is that of a “digital operation” in 
reference to digital computation. In referring to digital computation, 
Turing´s notion of computability is commonly mentioned, since Turing 
computation is often described as digital. It is commonly conceded that 
Turing computation captures the manner in which every mechanical 
device computes a calculable function such as successor function 
(Lobina, 2011). He proposed a theoretical notion of computability in 
order to answer the Entscheidungsproblem, or the question of whether, 
given a formal system, there is a general method for deciding if a well-
formed formula is a theorem of a system. Church and Turing both 
answered this question in the negative (King, 1996).
In this context, digital computation consists in the processing of 
strings of digits according to rules defined over the digits (Piccinini & 
Scarantino, 2010). This kind of processing is usually seen as performed 
by a Turing machine. A Turing machine is an abstract structure with 
which Turing reduced a computational process to its essentials (De 
Mol, 2018). The machine has, in part, an infinite tape divided into cells, 
each of which contains a digit (either “0” or “1”) and a read-write head 
which scans a single cell on the tape. The action of a Turing machine 
is determined by the current state of the machine, the digit in the cell 
currently being scanned and a table of transition rules (De Mol, 2018). 
Transition rules can be understood as procedures that state the following: 
“if the machine is in current state X and the cell being scanned contains 
the digit Y, then move to the next state Z taking action”. Actions are the 
outputs of the transition rules and consist either in writing a new digit 
ahead on the tape or moving the head to the right or left, selecting an 
already written digit. 
With these transition rules in mind, a digital operation is 
minimally characterized as a computational rule that maps inputs 
to outputs manipulating strings of digits. This sort of rule for digital 
computation is simply a map from the input string of digits to the output 
string of digits, plus some internal states. Examples of operations that 
may figure in a digital computation include addition, multiplication, 
sorting, etc. In the case of a Turing Machine, transition rules are explicit 
and algorithmic, in the sense that the machine has a finite list or table of 
executable instructions which specify a certain order of steps to achieve 
a result (Copeland, 1996). However, I am presenting a minimal notion 
of a digital operation, which does not require that the rules defining 
the computation be represented in the computing system, nor that the 
rules constitute a fixed algorithm followed step-by-step by a computing 
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system. All that the rules need to do is specify what relationship is 
obtained between the strings of digits (Piccinini, 2007). This minimal 
notion of a digital operation is enough to characterize Merge, which is a 
procedure that needn’t perform the transformations in any sequential 
order (Boeckx, 2009).
What kind of entities are the digits manipulated in digital 
computation? This question arises in order to specify the nature of a 
digital operation. Digits can be ordered to form sequences or strings 
of digits which are the vehicle of digital computation (Piccinini, 
2012). Roughly speaking, digits are discrete states of a system. These 
discrete elements can be letters of a finite alphabet or numbers of a 
binary or non-binary code. For example, digits can be used to express 
numbers such as “345”, where each digit is a numeral with a specific 
place within the series (Maley, 2011). Likewise, digits can be used to 
express the concatenated strings of zeros and ones (e.g. “0011010”), 
which constitute the instructions of a computer’s machine language. It 
should be noted that digits are discrete states of a system inasmuch 
as they are unambiguously distinguishable by the digital operation 
under normal processing conditions. The operation can distinguish 
atomic digits from one another because digits are macroscopic states 
of a system whose type can be reliably identified (Piccinini & Bahar, 
2013). Computing systems are organized so as to reliably distinguish 
digit tokens of different types and manipulate them according to their 
type (Piccinini, 2008). Take the following string of digits: “0001101”. The 
digital operation that computes it manipulates a finite number of digit 
types (0 and 1 in this case) and a finite number of digit tokens (four 
occurrences of 0 and three occurrences of 1). The operation is able to 
recognize the different occurrences of 0 in this string because it classifies 
them as a token of the type 0. 
In short, a huge (but finite) number of distinct tokens of digits 
correspond to a same digit type and a digital operation is sensitive to this. 
This characterization of a digital operation embodies what Haugeland 
calls “positive procedure” (Haugeland, 1981). Haugeland understands a 
digital device (which performs digital operations) to be one in which 
the tokens of a set of specified types can be written and read reliably 
and with absolute certainty. From his perspective, digital devices 
involve some form of writing and reading of various tokens of various 
types. The procedure to produce tokens given the type and determine 
the type of given tokens is positive, in the sense that it succeeds in its 
scopes absolutely and “without qualification”. So, a positive procedure 
manipulates digits reliably (“with astonishing precision”) since, under 
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normal conditions, there are no possible errors in the recognition of the 
corresponding digit types (Haugeland, 1981, p. 214). 
I should say that Haugeland´s positive procedure would 
rescue what is often thought to be a “digital operation” in classical 
cognitivism. Back to traditional roots of cognitivism, such as Turing´s 
machine proposal, Newell’s perceptual symbol processing hypothesis 
and Fodor´s computational theory of mind, digital operation would 
be understood in terms of manipulation of uninterpreted symbols 
(Turing, 1950; Newell, 1980; Fodor, 1994). Following these approaches, 
symbols are combined exclusively according to their formal/syntactic 
properties (such as shape) and these properties would be best 
understood as discrete properties of digits which are transformed 
in digital computation (Fodor, 2000). For sure, digital operations 
constitute positive procedures because combinations of symbols 
according to their formal properties need to reliably read with enough 
precision to recognize some discrete/formal properties over others. If 
symbols were not discrete entities computed positively, it would be 
difficult to see the mind as a computing device causally sensitive to the 
syntactic properties of the symbols (Fodor & Pylyshyn, 1995). 
I believe Merge is a positive procedure in the following sense: it 
is a compositional digital operation that manipulates special kinds of 
digits called “lexical items”. Each lexical item is a digit (e.g. “Mary”) 
and a sequence of lexical items is a string of digits computed by Merge 
(e.g. “Mary loves books”). Assuming that the FL has a lexicon which 
specifies the items that enter into the computational system, lexical 
items would be the complex objects that are combined by Merge 
(Chomsky, 1995). For example, “Mary” is a lexical item that can be 
considered a complex object since it has different linguistic features 
(e.g. semantic features, +ANIMAL, or syntactic features, +NN, 
among others). This item is grouped with others by Merge (e.g. “Mary 
loves books”) respecting their inner linguistic features. It should be 
pointed that lexical items are digits because they are discrete entities 
unambiguously distinguished by Merge. In part, Merge is able to 
compositionally combine the lexical items because this operation 
identifies the type to which the lexical item tokens correspond. The 
success of Merge as a set formation rule is due to the fact that it 
recognizes different types and identifies different tokens of a same 
type. In short, if Merge was not a positive procedure, it would not be an 
effective operation for the formation of hierarchical structures.
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3. The Brain is not Digital
This digital characterization of Merge makes the study of its 
biological reality problematic. In order to explain this idea, I will focus 
on computational neuroscience. This area of neuroscience is grounded 
on pioneering artificial intelligence work (such as McCulloch and Pitts, 
as well as Rosenblatt) and biophysics (such as Hodgkin and Huxley) 
(Kass, 2018). These proposals advanced a new domain of research in 
which computational models were proposed to explain neural activity 
and brain function at all levels of detail and abstraction, from sub-
cellular biophysics to human behavior (Kass, 2018). The current models 
of computational neuroscience are fed by concrete biophysical data and 
it is commonly believed that computational neuroscience also offers 
methods for the analysis of neural data (Kass, 2018). 
Most computational neuroscientists believe that the neural 
system performs computations (Piccinini, 2006). It is true that this 
needs to be established by more than just the existence of computational 
neuroscience. Developing computational models has not committed 
neuroscientists to the conclusion that brains compute, since any 
phenomena can be computationally modeled (Piccinini, 2006). However, 
according to Piccinini and Bahar, brains seem to perform generic 
computations. Generic computation is the processing of vehicles in 
accordance with rules that are sensitive to certain vehicle properties 
(Piccinini & Bahar, 2013). Generally speaking, vehicles are the variables 
that permit the transitions of states in the computational process and 
rules are just mappings from input to output that needn’t be explicitly 
represented. Assuming that this broad sense of computation captures a 
plurality of uses of this notion in cognitive science, it can be said that 
generic computation is physical when the rules are sensitive to the 
physical properties of the vehicles computed. 
As Sarpeshkar establishes, a physical system uses three 
physical resources to perform its computations: time, space and 
energy (Sarpeshkar, 1998). As such, generic physical computation 
is the processing of vehicles according to rules that are sensitive to 
vehicle properties such as time, space and energy. A neural system 
performs computations in the sense that it performs generic physical 
computations. Neural signals include the propagation of electric 
charges and the diffusion of chemical substances in which we can find 
different possible vehicles of computation. Accepting some plurality 
of neural vehicles, spikes, hormones and neurotransmitters have the 
physical properties (duration, location and some energy consumption) 
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needed to be considered the vehicles of neural computation. I want to 
emphasize in this section that the problem is that this generic physical 
computation, as presented, would not be digital.
It is true that McCulloch and Pitts argued that brains perform 
digital computation (McCulloch & Pitts, 1943). In their account 
of cognitive phenomena, they proposed idealized neural networks 
that operate on sequences of discrete inputs in discrete time. These 
networks produce digital outputs from digital inputs by means of 
discrete intermediate steps. More recently, Mochizuki and Shinomoto 
have proposed a mathematical model (the Hidden Markov Model) 
which analyzes electrochemical brain data in terms of discrete signals 
(Mochizuki & Shinomoto, 2014). The application of this model to brain 
data extracted from macaque monkeys shows that certain areas (e.g. 
the lateral geniculate nucleus) process information with discrete 
states. O’Reilly has made claims along the same lines as Mochizuki 
and Shinomoto (O’Reilly, 2006). He has proposed a biologically-based 
computational model of high-level cognition which supports some 
digital properties of the prefrontal cortex. 
Nevertheless, non-digital approaches to the study of the brain 
have been around since the 1980s (Arbib, 1983; Beim Graben et al., 
2008; Spivey, 2007). Many models of neural computation are based on 
continuous functions which are hardly computed by digital operations, 
as will be explained in Section 5. Agreeing with the general spirit of 
these models, I will try to show that the brain is not digital, in the 
sense that it does not process information using digital operations. It 
is true that authors such as Piccinini and Bahar intended to defend 
this negative thesis (Piccinini & Bahar, 2013). However, in this section, 
I would like to explore two different arguments that support this 
idea. These arguments take into consideration the already introduced 
notion of Haugeland’s “positive procedure” (Haugeland, 1981). I have 
already argued that a procedure is positive if it can reliably succeed in 
categorizing a given token as an instance of its intended type without 
error. In Haugeland’s account, digital operations are the procedures 
of physical devices that certainly type tokens. This would be the first 
premise of the following argument:
(i) A digital operation is a positive procedure
(ii) A positive procedure (indirectly) requires “noise-free” 
conditions
(iii) Brains would not operate under “noise-free” conditions
(iv) Brains would not use digital operations.
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What does it means that a positive procedure requires “noise 
free” conditions? Remember that what counts as success for a positive 
procedure is the fact that the procedure actually produces a token of a 
required type, and it correctly identifies the type of the token supplied. 
This success condition depends on the possibility that the operation 
could correctly “read” and “write” items without any interference 
(Haugeland, 1981). For instance, what counts for an inscription of the 
digit “1” to be of the type “1”, is determined by what the operation locally 
recognizes of such inscription without any active presence of background 
conditions that can obstruct the operation. Thus, a positive procedure 
is very precise because the suitable conditions provide a “noise-free” 
environment. As Piccinini says “Digital operations […] either they are 
performed correctly, regardless of noise, or else they return incorrect 
results, in which case the system is said to malfunction” (2008, p. 
32). But, what is “noise free” in this context? Take electromagnetic 
interference (EMI) as a usual form of electrical-noise pollution in digital 
computation, in which positive procedures are performed. Such devices 
are dramatically sensitive to these interferences and “Disastrous, if not 
annoying results, occur if a system, subsystem or component interferes 
with another through electromagnetic means” (Getz & Moeckel, 1996, p. 
1). Focusing on internal noise, components and subsystems are sources 
of EMI which emanate from one single element or a combination of 
components (Getz & Moeckel, 1996). The problem of internal EMI is 
considered during the initial design phase because it would be costly 
and often ineffective patches and going back into redesign. Design has 
the target of maximizing “noise immunity” or “noise free” conditions 
which can be described as device´s ability to prevent noise in its input 
from being transferred to its output (Getz & Moeckel, 1996, p. 8). EMI 
control techniques that pursue “noise immunity” involve both hardware 
implementations and procedures, such as shielding, filtering, wiring, 
among others. For example, shielding is used to reduce the amount of 
electromagnetic radiation reaching a sensitive victim circuit. In brief, 
noise free conditions depend on these kinds of techniques to eliminate 
interferences. 
Having said that, the brain does not process information under 
“noise-free” conditions. Brain is not a device designed to eliminate 
interferences such as EMI. Neural activity is usually conceived as the 
processing of information by a single neuron and, by extension, the firing 
activity of neural networks. Neuronal noise designates random influences 
on the transmembrane voltage of single neurons and networks. These 
influences come from spontaneous brain activity not triggered by any 
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sensory stimulus. It has been suggested that at least 75% of the brain’s 
energy consumption comes from the spontaneous firing of neocortical 
neurons in cortical microcircuits (Raichle & Mintun, 2006). This general 
noise can influence, either regularly or stochastically, the transmission 
and integration of neurons’ signals (Le Bon-Jego & Yuste, 2007). This 
influence on neural signals includes the chemical pacemaker-like 
activity of neurotransmitters and hormones, among others. In short, 
the processing of the brain would be affected by the interference of an 
indefinite number of physical conditions identified as “noise”. Circuits 
are exposed to this kind of interference, which is not previously filtered. 
So, either the brain does not use positive procedures or it uses them 
under conditions of continuous interferences, in which case operations 
would never work correctly. This last scenario cannot be the case since 
the brain seems to process information correctly even with the presence 
of higher levels of spontaneous activity (González-Villar et al., 2017). 
The second argument against the digital nature of the brain 
begins with the same premise as the argument above, but it exploits 
another characteristic of positive procedure:
(i) A digital operation is a positive procedure.
(ii A positive procedure (indirectly) requires that no token in 
fact be a token of more than one type.
(iii) We are not able to affirm that a neural spike is a token of just 
one type.
(iv) The brain would not proceed digitally.
Premise (ii) depends on the idea that digital operations individuate 
states that fall into the type-token distinction. As Piccinini (2008) says 
“…a string of digits is an ordered sequence of discrete elements of finitely 
many types, where each type is individuated…” (p. 34). Elsewhere, he 
adds that “programming a computer requires specifying how it must 
respond to different strings of digits by specifying how it must respond 
to different types of digit…” (p. 39). Despite the fact that it is difficult 
to clarify the difference between types and tokens of digits, it would 
be useful to follow Schneider (2011) in this respect. According to her, 
tokens of symbols/digits are physical states or “…patterns of energy (…) 
that fall into symbol types” (p. 120). Following Piccinini (2008), tokens 
in digital computation can be interpreted as “… physical digits that a 
computer can store” (p. 44) which are limited by the size of its physical 
memory. In contrast, types are thought to pertain in an abstract level. 
In this sense, types and tokens are not at the same symbolic level. While 
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type entities would be computational symbols, token entities would be 
concrete particular physical states that fall under these abstract types 
(Wetzel, 2006). 
It is well known that Haugeland (1989) introduces the concepts of 
“type” and “token” in digital computation by analogy to chess pieces. He 
underscores that pieces of the same type must function in the same way 
within a program, since interchanging them makes no computational 
difference (Schneider, 2011). The idea that any token can be substituted 
by another token of the same type in an operation without changing the 
computation is related to premise (ii) of the argument. Tokens of a same 
type are freely interchangeable, given that tokens pertain exclusively 
to one single type. If a token were related with more than one type, 
then substitution would not preserve the output of computations. 
According to premise (ii), in digital devices, types are “disjoint” in the 
sense that operations do not manipulate tokens that would be related to 
different types (Haugeland, 1981). For any candidate token, the positive 
procedure determines that the candidate is type “0” but it is not type “1”. 
No token is ever equivocal between two distinct types. If that were the 
case, this ambiguity would conspire against the efficiency and certainty 
of the positive procedure. If there were indefinitely many types to which 
any given token might belong, the digital device would not do its job 
reliably, as it is supposed to do.
Once again, the brain seems to lack this property of digital 
devices. To analyze this, instead of discussing tokens of digits, I will 
focus on neural spikes. McCulloch and Pitts were the first authors to 
treat neural spikes mathematically as digits (McCulloch & Pitts, 1943). 
They conceived spikes as idealized all-or-none events (they either occur 
or they do not) unambiguously distinguishable. So, what constitutes 
a neural spike? Neurons have the ability to propagate signals rapidly 
over large distances. They do so by generating characteristic electrical 
pulses or spikes that activate the synapse of the neighboring neurons. 
These pulses are supposed to represent stimuli such as light, sound 
intensity, motor action, direction of the arm movement, etc. A spike is a 
short-lasting electro-chemical phenomenon that starts in the axon and 
crosses it just to arrive to the terminal buttons. A spike is a consequence 
of a series of chemical changes in the axon membrane, changes that 
produce electrical activity in the neuron (Craver, 2007). To summarize, 
brain activity involves the presence of many spikes produced by one or 
thousands of neurons. 
Neural spikes are physical entities characterized according to 
physical properties such as duration and energy consumption (Schneider, 
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2011). This article has introduced the idea that these are the kind of 
physical properties to which the rules of generic physical computation 
are sensitive, and that neural spikes could be considered the vehicles of 
neural computations. It is true that there are different neural entities 
at different scales of the brain that are candidates to being vehicles. 
However, I want to concentrate on neurons as computational units 
and on spikes as vehicles allowing information to be transformed and 
combined before it is converted into neural output. 
The problem with these kinds of vehicles is that it is difficult 
to split them into a number of finite spike types. Consider energy 
consumption, for example, one of the physical properties of spikes. Neural 
spikes are electro-chemical entities that demand certain energy. To the 
best of my knowledge, spikes are not classified according to the amount 
of energy needed for spiking activity. It is not true that, for instance, 
spike type 1 demands X amount of energy while spike type 2 demands 
Y amount of energy. Now, consider spike duration, another physical 
property of spikes. As it is assumed in the literature, the individuation 
of single spikes depends on the temporal occurrence of them. McCulloch 
and Pitts proposed to divide spikes into time intervals whose length 
was equal to synaptic delay. However, this is an idealization and real 
neural firing occurs with high variability in time due to a large number 
of factors in the cellular environment (Piccinini & Bahar, 2013). Spikes 
occur stochastically, in the sense that they do not occur within fixed 
time intervals. So, the same sample space for spiking events during a 
time interval is uncountable infinite. This means that a rule of neural 
computation would be sensitive to the temporal occurrence of spikes, 
but it would not individuate them according to certain types. 
All of this frustrates the possibility of determining if a token 
belongs to one single type, as would be the case with a digital operation. 
If it is difficult to split spikes into a number of finite types, it is also 
difficult to determine if a token is related to one or more types. Digital 
operations manipulate digits which belong univocally to finitely many 
types. However, to classify tokens of spikes into types, first one should 
individuate them according to the presence or absence of the single 
token. 
4. First Option for Merge
One consequence of the discussion presented in Sections 2 and 
3 would be that Merge does not have any neural correlate. If Merge is 
conceived as a digital operation and the brain is not digital, then it is 
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easy to conclude that Merge is a combinatorial operation proposed in 
theoretical linguistics that does not have any brain basis. Yet, this option 
is methodologically problematic in the context of biolinguistics. This is 
because this thesis is unconcerned with biolinguistic considerations. It 
conflicts with two main methodological assumptions accepted in this 
domain. The first assumption comes from what is called “the minimalist 
program” (MP). The MP is the latest development that continues the 
trend in generative grammar that began with Chomsky (Marantz, 
1995). Generative grammar considers that natural language syntax is 
expressible by grammatical models endowed with recursive procedures, 
since natural languages involve recursive generative functions (Chomsky, 
2002). Various kinds of generative procedures have been explored for 
decades. The MP proposed that Merge is the basic recursive procedure 
involved in syntax. As was explained, this operation recursively strings 
together two elements forming a third which is a projection of one on the 
other two. According to the MP, this generative procedure is basically a 
“monotonic composition of atomic elements” (Chomsky, 1995). Strictly 
speaking, the MP is not a theory but a research program that falls 
within the bounds of normal science (Chomsky, 2014). It is true that 
biolinguistics is independent of the minimalist program inasmuch 
as many of its questions can be addressed outside of the minimalist 
context (Boeckx & Grohmann, 2007). However, biolinguistics and 
minimalism have experienced a graceful methodological integration. 
They are related because Chomsky, initiating the MP, provided the most 
important sources for biolinguistics (Boeckx, 2013). 
The MP seeks to approach the problem of determining the 
character of the FL from the “bottom up” focusing on how little can 
be attributed to Universal Grammar (Chomsky, 2007). In earlier 
approaches, it appeared that the design of language had to be highly 
articulated with many levels of representations and numerous 
intrinsically linguistic principles (Hornstein et al., 2005). But contrary 
to the idea that the FL must be reached with a complex and substantially 
unique structure, the “bottom-up” approach supports a more austere 
architecture of language. Indeed, the motivation for this bottom-up 
approach is substantially biological. It takes seriously the idea that the 
FL is, ultimately, a cognitive organ in which linguistics makes contact 
with biology (Yang, 2010). The bottom-up approach constitutes the 
kind of methodological considerations used to study organic systems 
(Chomsky, 2007). It is the general methodology related to the inquiry 
of biological objects comparable to the visual or immune systems, and 
other subcomponents of an organism. 
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The development of language, considered as any other biological 
system, involves three factors: (1) the genetic factors, which interpret 
part of the environment as linguistic experience, (2) the experience, 
which permits variations in a range of possibilities, and (3) principles 
not specific to the FL (Chomsky, 2007). The study of the FL in relation 
to these factors is engaged with “not entirely well-defined” claims 
such as “less is better than more” or “minimal search is better than 
deeper search” (Chomsky, 2014, p. 5). As with any domain of natural 
inquiry, proposals in linguistics are evaluated along dimensions such as 
parsimony and simplicity (Hornstein et al., 2005). The idea is to design a 
language system which has few and uncomplicated theoretical entities. 
Merge would be among these entities. 
In its most elementary form, the computational system of language 
consists solely of the most efficient computational operation to interface 
with other components of the mind (Boeckx, 2012). Merge would be the 
only procedure to compute the output expressions of I-language. In the 
simplest case, Merge-based-systems are compositional systems that 
combine lexical items (Jackendoff, 2011). It is true that in a Merge-
based-system it is not enough to capture all the facts about natural 
language. The minimalist claim is that, in order to kick-start all other 
linguistic operations, “all you need is Merge” (Boeckx, 2012, p. 322). 
The second assumption that (jointly with the previous claims 
about minimalism) clashes with the thesis that Merge does not have 
any neural correlate is what I call “the interactive levels of explanation”. 
Biolinguistics is essentially an inter-field research enterprise. It 
articulates developments from areas such as theoretical linguistics, 
psycholinguistics, neurolinguistics, cognitive ethology and genetics, 
among others. From a biolinguistic perspective, the properties of the 
FL cannot be studied by linguistics in isolation. The idea that cognitive 
capacity is the subject of different fields is intrinsically related to the idea 
that any cognitive capacity is subject to different levels of explanation 
(Marr, 1982). Fields and levels of explanation are not the same but, once 
a pluralism of fields is accepted, a pluralism of levels of explanation can 
also be accepted. In the case of biolinguistics, it can be identified as two 
main levels of explanation: the cognitive level and the neurobiological 
level of explanation. 
Theoretical linguistics belongs to the cognitive level of explanation 
and neurosciences belong to the neurobiological level. This distinction 
of levels of explanation is not the same as that proposed by Marr in the 
case of vision (Marr, 1982). This author presented three levels usually 
organized in the following hierarchical order: computational, algorithmic 
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and implementational levels. He considered the computational level to 
be the highest one in which cognitive scientists analyze, in very abstract 
terms, the particular type of task performed by the system (Bermúdez, 
2014). Such a level constitutes a mathematical specification of what 
is being computed and why. It outlines the mappings from one type 
of information into another regarding a problem to be solved. Marr 
himself pointed out that his theory of computation was rather similar to 
Chomsky´s competence. At algorithmic level, it aims to work on how the 
mapping function studied at the higher level is processed in real time. 
Lastly, implementational level would be the one in which computational 
operations are implemented by physical mechanisms. A mechanism can 
be thought of as an organized structure that executes some function or 
produces some phenomena in virtue of containing a set of constituent 
parts or entities that are organized so that they interact with one 
another and carry out their characteristic operations and processes 
(Machamer, Darden & Craver 2000). 
Let me focus on the implementational level which describes the 
physical realization of the mathematical mapping function that is being 
computed. According to Marr, this level does not incorporate computational 
notions. Following him, mechanisms implement computations as 
organized structures containing various constituent entities. In contrast 
to this, biolinguistics understands the neurological or implementational 
level as intrinsically computational. For instance, Carandini and Heeger 
(2012) proposed that many neural response properties can be understood 
in terms of  canonical neural computations such as normalization, 
recurrent amplification, linear filtering or exponentiation. These are 
standard computational modules that apply the same operations in 
a variety of contexts. The key point is that these authors consider 
the nervous system as intrinsically computational. Computational 
neuroscientists operate with their own mathematical tool without 
committing themselves to implementional intentions. Even further, both 
cognitive and neurobiological levels are supposed to be computational 
given that the cognitive level presents computational primitives while 
the neurobiological level presents neural computations (Sarpeshkar, 
1998). Both levels articulate computational notions, something that could 
not be affirmed in the case of Marr’s approach.
One of the fundamental questions, in this case, would be how 
to integrate these different levels of explanation. The use of different 
levels gives rise to the question on how to relate the components at 
play in each level. Considering biolinguistics, the question is about 
the connections between current brain/language research. Following 
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Poeppel and Embick (2005), there are two different options to 
understand the interdisciplinary study of language and the brain. One 
possibility is that the study of the brain reveals aspects of the structure 
of linguistic knowledge while the other possibility is that language 
can be used to investigate the nature of computation in the brain. 
The first possibility is a “bottom-up” strategy whereas the second is a 
“top-down” strategy (Bermúdez, 2014). According to the “bottom-up” 
strategy, the neurobiological level of explanation guides the cognitive 
level, in contrast to the “top-down” strategy, in which the cognitive 
level informs the neurobiological explanation. In either case, there is 
a tacit assumption that “combined investigation promises to generate 
progress” in the study of language (Poeppel & Embick, 2005, p. 2). I 
agree with Poeppel and Embrick (2005) that the idea that neuroscience 
is in a position to inform linguistic theory, and vice versa, is clearly an 
open question. These two positions lack any obvious justification within 
scientific practice. However, the third option suggesting that these 
areas pursue an isolated program of research would not be attractive. 
Certainly, there is a serious risk of its being effectively sui generis. 
It should be pointed out that in biolinguistics there is an interactive 
relation between levels of explanation, in the sense that “bottom-up” 
and “top-down” strategies come together. In Boeckx’s words “It is true 
that one’s view of language will determine the range of hypotheses one 
is willing to entertain when it comes to the biological bases of language, 
but the latter also depends on one´s view of biology” (Boeckx, 2012, p. 
33). However, I would like to focus on the “top-down” strategy. 
It proposes to take linguistic categories, such as Merge, seriously 
and use them to investigate how the brain computes language (Bilgrami 
& Rovane,, 2005). In my opinion this is a very promising strategy in 
order to integrate the brain/language research as encouraged by 
Poeppel and Embick (2005). It is true that it has deep problems that 
need to be solved. For instance, Poeppel and Embick identify what they 
call the “granularity mismatch problem” which states the difficulty to 
relate the fine-grained computational operations of certain linguistic 
theories jointly with the neuroscientific studies of language. Although 
this is a serious problem, I agree with Poeppel and Embick (2005) that 
it can be solved by postulating “computational operations that are at the 
appropriate level of abstraction” (5) being Merge one of these operations.
In sum, even accepting the “bottom-up” restrictions, the “top-
down” strategy allows for the importance of Merge in the study of 
the neural substrate of language to be considered. Merge would be a 
computational notion proposed in the cognitive level of explanation 
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that, in fact, guides the neurobiological inquiry. In conclusion, if it is 
assumed (i) that Merge is almost the only linguistic operation of the 
FL and (ii) that it leads to the development of certain neurobiological 
explanations then, for methodological reasons, it would be difficult to 
accept that this operation does not have any neural correlate.
These observations can be complemented with additional 
difficulties. The scenario presented in this section leads to two 
problematic options. According to the first one, the MP could take into 
account another operation instead of Merge. Setting aside Merge, the 
FL would be constituted by another recursive procedure which would 
guide the research on the neural basis of language. Some may think 
that minimalists are too obsessed with Merge and, given that generative 
grammars have proposed different recursive functions, it is time to end 
this obsession. However, to the best of my knowledge, no one in the 
MP has proposed any real candidate with the same recursive power of 
Merge. What kind of operation would replace Merge? What guarantees 
that this operation will be able to guide the neurophysiological research 
on language?
Another option would be to preserve Merge in the MP but accept 
that this procedure does not have a neural correlate. Poeppel and Embick 
(2005) maintain that the failure to detect computational linguistic notions 
in the brain does not necessarily imply that the notions are incorrect. 
Accepting this, Merge would be a correct minimalist operation that is 
not detected in brain activity. Nevertheless, biolinguistics considers 
the minimalist hypotheses that are supposed to drive naturalistic 
research (Lorenzo, 2013). If properties of language do not receive any 
naturalistic explanation, then “the biolinguistic approach comes down 
on the essentials” (Lorenzo, 2013). This methodological consideration 
should not be read as a mere stipulation. Chomsky understands that 
in biolinguistics, methodological considerations can often be reframed 
as empirical theses concerning organic systems (Chomsky, 2007). 
This means that the substantive hypothesis about language has to be 
reframed as an empirical option. The problem of Merge would be how to 
accommodate to this empirical possibility.  
5. Second Option for Merge 
Given, first, that Merge is characterized as a digital operation and, 
second, that the brain is not digital, then a possible conclusion would 
be that the brain realizes Merge but in a non-digital way. This section 
will explore the scope and difficulties of this thesis. For this purpose, 
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the analysis will be divided into two main parts. Initially, the sense in 
which the brain would operate not digitally will be clarified, with the 
introduction of the idea that the brain could compute information 
according to analog operations. This will lead to an examination of how 
an analog brain operation would realize a digital operation such as Merge 
and some of the problems with this argument will be addressed there. 
The idea that neural processes are not digital in the sense that 
they perform analogue computations is not new (Gerard, 1951; Rubel, 
1985). In fact, analogue computations were proposed before the existence 
of digital computation and were used widely in the 1950s and 1960s 
(Piccinini, 2010). Analogue computation constitutes a broad notion which 
is often contrasted with digital computation. In this sense, “non-digital” 
and “analogue” would be synonymous. So, what would an analogue 
operation be?  As mentioned above, a digital operation is a rule that maps 
inputs to outputs manipulating strings of digits. In contrast, an analogue 
operation is a rule that maps inputs to outputs manipulating continuous 
variables (Piccinini, 2010). Whereas the inputs and outputs of digital 
operations are strings of digits, the inputs and outputs of analogue 
operations are what mathematicians call “real variables” (Pour-El, 1974). 
Real variables are physical magnitudes that vary continuously within 
certain time intervals, taking any real value from a range of values. It 
is assumed that real variables fluctuate dynamically over time. Real 
variables are used in differential equations which are equations that 
mathematically presuppose that both the modeled physical systems as 
well as space-time are continuous. Algebraic differential equations have 
the form: P(y, yt1, yn, …, ytn) = 0,  where P is a polynomial with integer 
coefficients and y is a function of x (Pour-El, 1974). 
Unlike digits, real variables allude to non-discrete states of a 
system (Piccinini, 2010). If real variables vary continuously over time, 
then the occurrence of the different variables should not be understood 
as a sequence of all-or-none identifiable events. This characteristic of 
real variables shapes the kind of operation that manipulates them. 
Quoting Haugeland once again, an analog operation would be an 
“approximation procedure”, that is, one which can “come close to perfect 
success” (Haugeland, 1981, p. 83). Approximation procedures are the 
antithesis of positive procedures in the sense that they admit a certain 
margin of error or degree of deviation from perfect success. According 
to Haugeland, the margin of error in approximation procedures is never 
zero, since perfect approximate procedures are impossible. 
Why is the output of approximation procedures usually an 
approximation to the desired output? Why do analog operations have 
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this low level of computational precision? In my opinion, the answer 
to these questions depends on the relation between the operation 
and the variables computed. Approximation procedures identify and 
manipulate real variables. Nevertheless, to the extent that these 
variables are non-discrete states of a system, the operation is not able 
to distinguish them unambiguously. As I presented, a digital operation 
distinguishes unambiguously tokens of digits as discrete states because 
the procedure can identify the type to which the token belongs. This is 
not the case for an analog operation, which manipulates occurrences 
of continuous variables without identifying any type to which they 
might belong. For instance, the real variable 1 would be unambiguously 
distinguished from the real variable 2 in the case of an operation that 
would identify the types of these tokens. However, an analog operation 
is sensitive to the instances of real variables but it is not sensitive to 
its possible types.
So, what does it mean to say that the brain, operating analogically, 
realizes Merge? I would like to limit the notion of realization by focusing 
on “Computational Brain Realization”. According to this characterization 
of realization, both realized and realizer properties are computational. 
This notion is limited to the relation between the computational 
cognitive properties and computational psycho-chemical properties of 
the brain. It seems that realization is a metaphysical relation between 
the properties from different levels of organization (Weiskopf, 2011). The 
notion of “levels of organization” captures the idea that there are higher 
and lower ontological levels of realization. However, I want to connect 
the notion of “Computational Brain Realization” with the distinction 
of the levels of explanation as already mentioned in Section 4. There a 
distinction was made between the cognitive and neurobiological levels of 
explanation. With these levels in mind, it would not be controversial to 
consider that cognitive properties are posited by cognitive explanations, 
while neural properties are posited by neurobiological explanations. 
Taking into consideration the MP and computational neuroscience, 
both cognitive and neurobiological levels are computational. While 
MP posits computational notions in the cognitive level of explanation, 
computational neuroscience also posits computational notions in 
the neurobiological level of explanation. Cognitive scientists usually 
present their theories in computational terms and, in recent decades, 
many neuroscientists have started using computational notions to 
study neuronal activity (Piccinini, 2010). Thus, the properties posited 
by such theories would also be computational. Despite their differences, 
both kinds of properties are computational in a nontrivial sense because 
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they are minimally presented as mappings from inputs to outputs in 
accordance with certain rules (Piccinini & Bahar, 2013).
Let us specify the nature of some computational cognitive 
properties introduced in “Computational Brain Realization”. Some of 
these properties can be considered higher order physical properties. 
An example of this would be the syntax of mental representations as 
proposed by Fodor in the computational and representational theory of 
the mind (Fodor, 1987). It is true that biolinguistics is not intrinsically 
engaged with representationalism, but my aim in this part of the paper is 
to focus on the notion of “syntax” already presented by Fodor, just to study 
some of its properties. Syntax is a cognitive property since it belongs to 
mental representation, which is a notion posited in the cognitive level of 
explanation. It is also a computational property because it is a property 
of representational vehicles which are transformed by certain rules of 
transformation. Fodor considers that syntax is a higher order physical 
property because, at an abstract level, “it might determine the causes 
and the effects of its tokenings in much the same way that the geometry 
of a key determines which locks it will open” (Fodor, 1987, p. 19). Fodor 
thinks that syntactic structure would be an abstract feature of the 
shape of symbols and, because the shape is a potential determinant of 
their causal role, syntax would also be a determinant of its causal role. 
I believe that Merge could be characterized as Fodor understands 
syntax of mental representations. This would characterize Merge with 
the appropriate level of abstraction demanded by Poeppel and Embick 
(2005) to relate linguistic operations with neurosciences.  Merge would 
be a computational cognitive property realized by computational 
psycho-chemical properties of the brain emphasizing that Merge is 
a higher order physical property. As syntax would be a property of 
a physical property, such as the shape of symbols, Merge would be a 
property of some physical properties such as computational physico-
chemical properties of the brain. Merge potentially and indirectly 
determines at a more abstract level some causal relations established 
in the brain. In this sense, Merge would be a second order physical 
property of the brain functionally presented. The idea that the brain 
realizes Merge not digitally would therefore be as follows: the brain 
instantiates Merge (as a cognitive property which constitutes an input-
output mapping controlled by a digital operation) in virtue of the fact 
that it instantiates the same input-output mapping of Merge but 
controlled by an analog operation. This realization relation links the 
cognitive mapping of Merge with a neural mapping changing a digital 
operation for an analogical one. 
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Up to this point, this article has focused on clarifying in what 
sense the brain would realize Merge but not digitally. Whether the 
brain in fact realizes Merge is an empirical question that shall now 
be examined. Indeed, neural activity seems to have analog properties. 
Spikes, which are the most significant signals transmitted by neurons, 
have already been mentioned in the discussion of McCulloch and 
Pitts, who conceived of spikes as an all-or-none event of the nervous 
system (McCulloch & Pitts, 1943). However, the presence or absence of 
a spike at any time is far from an all-or-none event. ‘Spike’ refers to a 
rapid and fleeting change in the electrical potential difference across 
a neuron’s membrane due to opening of voltage-gated sodium (Na+) 
and potassium (K+) channels (Craver, 2007). This potential difference, 
known as “membrane potential” (Vm), consists of a separation of charged 
ions on either side of the membrane. In a resting state, positive ions 
line up against the extracellular surface of the membrane and negative 
ions line up on the intracellular surface. In the spiking activity of the 
neuron, the membrane becomes fleetingly permeable to Na+ and K+ ions. 
This allows the ions to diffuse across the cell membrane, changing the 
Vm. The spike consists of a rapid rise in Vm to a maximum value followed 
by a rapid decline in Vm to values below the resting state. After that, the 
neuron enters into a refractory period where the cell is less excitable. 
To be sure, this variation of the permeability of the membrane 
has analog properties since it can be characterized as the dynamical 
evolution of continuous variables in real time. Hodgkin and Huxley 
represented spiking activity as a continuous time-course of permeability 
changes as a function of Vm introducing the idea that the brain performs 
analog computations (Hodgkin and Huxley, 1952). Still, even accepting 
that neural processes have some aspects of analog computations, this 
is not enough to evaluate the possibility that the brain realizes Merge 
not digitally. To examine this last thesis, it would be necessary to find 
in the spiking activity that the input-output mapping with continuous 
variables corresponds to the input-output mapping of Merge. Isolated 
analog properties of the brain are not enough. They have to be presented 
as the neural realization of a digital operation such as Merge. 
It should be recalled that a digital operation maps inputs to 
outputs manipulating strings of digits. In this mapping, the operation 
unifies different occurrences of tokens of digits under a finite number of 
types. In contrast, an analog operation is not able to unify the continuous 
variables manipulated under a finite set of types. This fundamental 
difference between digital and analog operations seems to be crucial for 
the case of the neural realization of Merge. An analog operation would 
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effectively encode an input-output digital mapping in that it would 
manipulate real variables with unbounded precision. Given certain 
input-output digital computation, an analog operation would reflect it 
just in case it can assign a real value (e.g. RV1, RV2, RVn…) to each 
individual digit token (e.g. token digit 1, token digit 2, token digit n…). 
In other words, an analog operation has to deliver an output that is 
digitally produced according to type-token relations but, in this case, 
manipulating unbounded real variables considered independently. 
In principle, a system is said to be continuous under a given 
mathematical description (Piccinini, 2008). This means that, at least 
abstractly speaking, the precision of the different real variables 
manipulated by an analog operation depends on the mathematical 
resources employed to design the device. It is true that a real variable 
can take any real number as a value and this gives some freedom for 
the system to achieve different levels of precision. However, analog 
operations of physical systems, such as the brain, inherit the limits 
proper of the physical device. In practice, a physical magnitude within 
a device can only take values within the bounds of the physical limits 
of the system. If some of the relevant physical magnitudes take values 
beyond certain bounds, then the system breaks down. For example, 
the values of the inputs and outputs of analog computers and their 
components must fall within certain limits, e.g. ±100 volts. (Piccinini, 
2008). So, in the design of analog computers, engineers know the 
appropriate scale of continuous values that the physical device is able 
to compute. Nevertheless, this is not the case with the brain. 
It is true that in computability theory, there are digital simulations 
of analog computations (Rubel, 1989). Besides, there are concrete 
computer machines, such as synthesizers, which are digital computers 
that simulate analog software. So, there are neither mathematical 
nor physical restrictions to simulating digitally analog functions. 
The problem I want to emphasize is not a conceptual impossibility of 
relating digital with analog operations. My point is an empirical one 
related to (i) the resources that we lack to study neural architecture and 
(ii) the complexity of this computing system which is the brain. Because 
neuroscience is in this stage of research and our brains are very complex 
systems with real variables, it is difficult to understand how a digital 
operation such as Merge could be analogically implemented in the brain. 
Currently, we have no idea which is the appropriate scale of continuous 
variables that the brain as a physical system is able to process. It is a 
problem of the current state of science that means we cannot determine 
if the brain has sufficient precision in the manipulation of real variables 
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in order to implement digital operations such as Merge. Is the brain an 
analog system that performs computations over real variables with the 
sufficient precision to give rise to Merge? That empirical question has 
yet to be answered. 
 
6. Conclusion
Biolinguistics faces two contrasting thesis when studying the 
neuronal bases of Merge. First, that Merge is a digital operation and, 
second, that the brain could not be understood as a digital computing 
system. In this essay I wanted to evaluate the consequences of these 
theses. I argued that, for methodological reasons, biolinguistics would 
not accept that Merge has any brain basis. Merge would be almost the 
only linguistic operation of the FL that guides most of the neurobiological 
explanations in biolinguistics. Moreover, I tried to show that the current 
state of the science is not able to establish if the brain, as an analog 
system, realizes Merge. It is an open question whether the brain has 
enough precision to implement a digital operation. In my opinion, 
either we accept the empirical difficulties of considering the brain as an 
analog system or we conceive the brain as a non-digital and non-analog 
processing system. 
In facing these problems, there is a provisional strategy for 
studying the neural reality of Merge that can be advanced. First, treat this 
operation as a rule used in generic physical computation. As discussed, 
generic physical computation is the processing of vehicles according to 
rules that are sensitive to vehicle properties such as time, space and 
energy. Second, heterogeneous brain data about Merge must be taken 
into consideration. Functional neuroscience says that Merge seems to 
be localized in B44 and B45 (Broca’s area) (Yusa, 2016; Schlesewsky & 
Bornkessel-Schlesewsky, 2013; Zaccarella & Friederici, 2015). From an 
electrophysiological perspective, Merge seems to correlate to the gamma 
and alpha range of oscillations characteristic of the thalamus (Boeckx 
& Benítez-Burraco, 2014). How to bring together this data while taking 
into consideration a minimal characterization of Merge as an operation 
of generic physical computation remains an open question.
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